Kosovo has become an international problem. Was it possible to avoid or at least diminish this occurrence by means of wiser politics?
It could have been diminished, but not avoided. After the October changes we had eleven years to try to put Kosovo in a different context, to try to solve some issues in a different way and more realistically. I think that is when the precious time has been lost by using Kosovo as a tool of internal politics instead of a political method that could lead to a progress. In brief, I think our post-October political elite has not proved itself to be more capable of solving this problem than the previous dominance of Milosevic.
In recent times the authorities are talking less about Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia and more about the protection of Serbs and Serbian interests. Are we witnessing any changes in the current politics?
Serbian officials have come up with some kind of directory of priorities, but there are still no signs of a direction in which these issues could be resolved. The priorities that President Tadic has listed: the north of Kosovo, the provinces, the protection of Serbs and Serbian interests in Kosovo, the Serbian property, are some of the issues that could occur on the agenda of the extended negotiations in Brussels. What we have not heard so far is the viewpoint on what our authorities really want and believe that could be achieved in Kosovo. During the past few years, even decades, we have publicly discussed many possible models, but these thoughts never got an exact political shape. Each time they were pushed down on the agenda by some other occurrences. In the second half of the 90s the Tyrolean model became very popular. Its aim was to bring the results and make a ground for the negotiations. The Aland Islands were also a topic of discussion. The old government supported the talks about different models but did not have the understanding for their implementation. During the trial in Hague, Milosevic said the Tyrolean model was the idea of the people in charge of this problem. Serbia has used up all the time it had for taking an initiative and, as a consequence, the western forces have started the military intervention and changed the conditions.
Have Serbian authorities learned any lessons from this case?
Their starting point was a model of Kosovo in Serbia, but they ended up with a model of Serbia in Kosovo, and even in that case their time has run up. The post-October government simply had no strength to suggest certain solutions that could involve a political risk, whether in solving internal issues or in the relations with the West, as domestic opposition would strongly rebel against them. The lack of political will and courage are the main reasons why all good alternatives for Serbia have been used up.
To which degree is Kosovo an international matter today, and does Serbia have any influence in it?
Kosovo could hardly be a domestic matter for Serbia nowadays. It is domestic only in a way that it could affect the outcome of Serbian elections, and not in the sense that Serbia could significantly influence it. In the current circumstances of intensifying crisis Belgrade has a marginal role. Some state officials have been saying that Belgrade cannot instruct the Serbs in the north of Kosovo what to do, but on the contrary, can expect to be dominated by them.
Can things be changed? What can Serbian authorities do now?
Very little. The EU and Kosovo slogan wanted to draw attention to the fact that Serbian politics cannot be focused only on Kosovo and it made certain results, regardless of the way it outcomes have been interpreted today. The European Commission suggestion for Serbia’s candidacy is the best evidence for this statement. But, speaking of Kosovo, a little progress has been made. The negotiations about technical issues remind me of the mid 90s when, upon the Operation Storm, only Eastern Krajina was speared of military attacks. The American general Jacques Klein who was in charge of this province has refused to negotiate about political issues and insisted only on technical ones. When he resolved these technical issues Eastern Krajina became a part of Croatia.
A think we can draw a parallel between this case and technical negotiations about Kosovo. Belgrade’s decision to suspend these negotiations shows that current government is aware of the possible risk, so are the Serbs in the north of Kosovo. It is suspected that negotiations would end up with integration in political system of Kosovo, and the maximum Serbs can get is the “Ahtisaari plus”. However, an this moment there are even chances for the autonomy of the North, in spite of the statements from Pristina that this is nonsense. It is interesting that even daily newspapers from Pristina “Koha Ditore” mentions Brussels’ request that Serbs need to get more than just “Ahtisaari”.